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A B S T R A C T   
Energy controversies have been widely studied. Such studies are, however, generally based on either single case 
studies, providing rich and in-depth understanding of (local) dynamics of planning and implementation pro-
cesses, or they focus on understanding responses to a specific technology (not bound to a location). Therefore 
these studies tend to overlook a key dynamic in controversy, namely that publics respond to projects by drawing 
on earlier experiences with a similar technology elsewhere, or with earlier experiences with other technologies 
in their vicinity. We refer to this dynamic as controversy spillover. The notion of controversy spillover helps to 
understand how the discursive space of controversy changes over time. In case studies, other controversies are 
usually considered as context, i.e. as an external condition. However, in order to understand the temporal dy-
namics of public engagement with energy projects, spillover from other controversies deserves to be investigated 
more as an object of interest, rather than as an external condition. The aim of this paper is to conceptualize 
controversy spillover as an important dynamic in controversies and to develop a research agenda. We identify 
three different types of spillover: 1) geographical (i.e. between the same energy technology in different loca-
tions), 2) historical (i.e. with respect to earlier experiences at the same location), 3) technology (i.e. between 
different technologies). Three empirical examples serve to illustrate the three types of spillover. We finalize the 
paper with a research agenda for further conceptualization and empirical analysis of the notion of controversy 
spillover.   
1. Introduction 
With increasing policy efforts to implement climate change miti-
gation measures, the number and scale of renewable energy projects is 
growing. Quite often these projects are confronted with local, or more 
widespread, public resistance. The focus of this paper is on such in-
stances of controversy, i.e. social conflicts arising from the realization of 
a specific energy project at a specific location (e.g. a wind farm, a 
geothermal doublet, an electrical substation), where local communities 
organize advocacy and opposition. Such social conflict may be rooted in 
a variety of conflicting interests, expectations, or values [1,2]. Con-
troversies are dynamic social processes: new action groups that put new 
issues or concerns on the agenda may emerge over time, support may be 
mobilized from (environmental) NGOs and often also from local 
governments or influential individuals. However, controversy about a 
local energy project typically also involves wider policy issues re-
garding the long term regional, national or global energy transition, as 
well as issues pertaining to local democracy, social cohesion, trust in 
institutions and so on. Thus, generally, it is not just a local conflict, nor 
just an energy conflict [3]. 
Policymakers, project initiators and society at large struggle to un-
derstand how public protest to energy projects comes about, and how 
these projects can be developed in such a way that the energy transition 
can be realized. After all, many energy projects have been stalled, de-
layed or cancelled due to protest or lack of support [4–6]. Many 
scholars have been studying public responses to energy technologies 
and (local) energy projects in disciplinary fields like environmental 
psychology and risk perception (e.g. [7–9]), as well as in policy and 
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planning (e.g. [1,10,11], see [11] for an overview). From an instru-
mental perspective, it is very understandable that the main interest of 
policymakers concerns the question how to successfully realize these 
projects and meet their commitments. Yet, more recent literature is also 
pointing to democratic implications of the energy transition, showing 
that a purely instrumental perspective raises ethical concerns, including 
concerns associated with energy justice [12–16]. 
The energy transition has been typically studied as a complex so-
ciotechnical process [17,18], where the normative end goal is to realize 
a successful transition to a sustainable energy system. However, the 
pace of this transition as well as the means to achieve it are subject to 
severe contention and power struggles [19,20]. Public engagement in 
the energy transition is generally considered a necessity, either to raise 
support, or to improve energy democracy. In addition to descriptive 
studies of public engagement, there is a rich body of literature on the 
development, application and evaluation of methods for public parti-
cipation to be used by governmental bodies, companies, or research 
groups. This literature, however, seems to ignore the fact that there is a 
great variety in the forms of public engagement with energy transitions, 
beyond invited participation. So far, ‘self-organised participation’ such 
as protests and social conflict have received little attention in this lit-
erature [3,21–23]. 
Starting from the notion that controversy itself can be viewed as a 
form of participation and as a participatory assessment of a new energy 
technology or proposed project [3,13,95], we would like to contribute 
to a better understanding of the dynamics through which such assess-
ments evolve. A better understanding is much needed to support ef-
fective and legitimate energy system transformation. The premise at the 
heart of our conceptual thinking is the acknowledgement that public 
engagement is a complex and dynamic process, that goes beyond 
“particular, pre-given and discrete [public engagement events]” ([24], 
p. 200), involving interrelated forms and instances of public engage-
ment. In the many studies that analyse the dynamics of public en-
gagement, the system boundaries are typically drawn around a single 
case (often a specific local energy project) or one type of technology, 
thereby excluding these wider systemic interactions ([24], also see the 
overview in [11]). 
When reviewing several cases of controversies about the planning of 
local energy projects studied by the authors [19,25,96–98], we ob-
served that in all cases the dynamics of the controversy were shaped to 
a large extent by what happened in other controversial energy projects. 
In the Netherlands, for instance, public resistance to all kinds of un-
derground activities has become strongly influenced by the fierce pro-
tests against exploration for (unconventional) shale gas, and earth-
quakes due to (conventional) natural gas production in the northern 
part of the country. In this paper, we conceptualize this dynamic in 
controversies as controversy spillover. We argue that controversy spil-
lover occurs when actors change the discursive space of a controversy 
by explicitly referring to experiences with a similar technology else-
where, or with earlier experiences with other projects at the same lo-
cation, thereby influencing the dynamics of the controversy. A con-
troversy spillover could also take place when the discursive space 
around a controversy about a local energy project changes as a result of 
actors referring to issues or information from other controversial pro-
jects, applying the same or other energy technologies. Spillover focuses 
attention to how the discursive space of controversy changes over time. 
The objective of our paper is to spell out the notion of controversy 
spillover such that it can help us to understand public engagement 
dynamics. Such understanding is needed to support effective and le-
gitimate public engagement in light of the energy transition. To this 
end, in Section 2 we will first elaborate on the concept of controversy 
spillover. In Section 3, we will present three empirical examples (i.e. 
shale gas controversy in the Netherlands, Swiss controversy on deep 
geothermal energy and a wind energy case in the province of Groningen 
in the Netherlands), each to illustrate a specific type of controversy 
spillover. For these cases, we draw on our earlier analysis [19,95–99]. 
In Section 4, we use these empirical examples to further discuss the 
concept of controversy spillover. Section 5 presents our conclusion and 
four lines of research to further understand and analyse controversy 
spillover dynamics in light of the energy policy and planning. 
2. Conceptualizing spillovers between energy controversies 
The observation that publics in energy controversies draw on other 
experiences (in this case, other controversies) has been made before, 
but these other experiences are often considered as context (e.g. [1]), 
i.e. as external and independent of the data [26]. We argue that it is 
worthwhile to turn controversy spillover into an object of interest in the 
study on public engagement. We will elaborate on the problematic 
nature of context in Section 2.2, after we have discussed other usages of 
the term spillover in Section 2.1. In Section 2.3 we conceptualize 
controversy spillover as agendasetting and in 2.4 we will describe the 
three ideal types of controversy spillovers in energy controversies. 
2.1. Usage of the term ‘spillover’ in other fields 
We use the notion of controversy spillover to analyse how a con-
troversy gets influenced by another controversy elsewhere in time or 
place. Spillover is a generic term that is used in many different domains 
to denote how one instance or situation influences a previously, or 
seemingly, unconnected other instance or situation. It has been ori-
ginally introduced in the field of economics to describe the positive or 
negative external effects of economic activity on other apparently un-
connected activities [27]. The term ‘knowledge spillover’ is a particular 
form of that, in which the output of Research & Development activities 
by innovators is quickly taken over and profitably used by other eco-
nomic actors [28]. It has also been used in fields such as marketing and 
sociology, for instance to describe how a scandal or unethical behaviour 
by one firm can affect the image of a whole product category and even 
other brands [29], how political scandals can influence the attitude 
towards other political figures and institutions [30], how racial con-
flicts can influence social policies [31], and how the reputational crisis 
of one organization can spill over into other organizations [32]. Akin 
et al. [33] suggest that, in respect of citizen attitudes spillover, we 
might see spillover effects in the attitudes towards labelling of nano-
technology products which are influenced by attitudes towards ge-
netically modified organisms. Also, in the social movement literature 
the concept has been used to describe how one social movement in-
fluences the other, for instance in terms of organisational structure and 
framing [34]. In environmental psychology, it has been used to analyse 
behavioural spillover between different domains or settings. Littleford 
et al. [35], for example, found no evidence of spillover between energy 
use behaviour in the office and at home, while Lanzini & Thøgersen  
[36] found a spillover from “green” purchasing to other (mostly low- 
cost) pro-environmental behaviours. 
Although it does not literally refer to spillover, the “social amplifi-
cation of risk” theory by Kasperson & Kasperson [37] describes a similar 
phenomenon. Labelled as a ‘ripple effect’, this theory describes how risk 
events can be ‘amplified’ by introduction of “substantial temporal and 
geographical extension of impact” ([38], p. 184). 
2.2. Why ‘context’ is a problematic concept 
The notion of context is widely used in social science research on 
energy infrastructure [39,40]. Although reference to context is less 
explicit in practice, it is quite common that certain features of a social 
or physical environment are presented as relevant for the siting of en-
ergy infrastructure [41–45]. Context accounts for spatial and temporal 
variation in the reactions to and acceptance of technologies by local 
publics. 
While some disciplines like linguistics have a relatively well-defined 
understanding of ‘context’, the notion is ill-defined in many social 
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science disciplines and most often consists of a collection of attributes 
that are specific to a situation: socio-economic, historical, cultural, in-
stitutional, physical, legal, and political aspects are often seen as con-
textual attributes. These attributes are then treated as independent 
external variables co-explaining the observed phenomenon [46]. Dis-
cussions in the fields of science and technology studies and socio-
linguistics point to the problems of such a definition of context  
[26,47–49]. If one takes context as a set of external variables to the 
object of study, then “context, is precisely the sum of factors that make 
no difference to the data” ([26], p.144). A further issue linked to such 
an understanding is who or what determines what belongs to the con-
text and what not. That is, what should be considered as relevant to 
understand the object of study [46,48]? What one actor considers as 
relevant context, might be considered as irrelevant by another. 
As underlined by Latour [26], actors involved in socio-technical 
controversies are always referring to elements which might seem ex-
ternal to the given situation to explain what happens: national laws, 
global market prices or manufacturing standards in another country. By 
doing so however, they are somehow redefining the boundaries of the 
controversy by bringing in contextual elements. In such an under-
standing, context does not exist independently of and external to the 
actors referring to it, and thus it cannot be defined by a set of objective 
variables [48]. Van Dijk [47] argues that context should not be defined 
as a situation that influences (or is influenced by) the phenomenon it 
relates to. Rather, context is the way participants define what influences 
(and is influenced by) the situation they are engaged with: “Contexts 
are thus not some kind of objective condition or direct cause, but rather 
(inter)subjective constructs designed and ongoingly updated in inter-
action by participants as members of groups and communities” ([48], 
p.XX). Latour and Van Leeuwen, for example, suggest to simply 
abandon any reference to context [26,49]. We propose to use the term 
‘controversy spillover’ to describe the processes through which con-
textual elements, more specifically other controversies in time or place, 
become part of the discursive space of controversies. Firstly, as com-
pared to context, spillover focuses attention to the relation between 
controversies as object of interest, rather than to a controversy itself. 
Secondly, it emphasises the temporal dynamics of controversies as so-
cial processes where context is not static, but where that what actors 
deem relevant as context is changing over time. 
2.3. Controversy spillover as agenda-setting 
To understand the role of controversy spillovers in energy con-
troversies, we will relate them to the process of agenda-setting. This 
notion has been introduced in 1960 by E.E. Schattschneider to describe 
the way in which policies are made in a representative democracy [50], 
allowing factions to take position with regards to specific policy issues. 
Although the formalised institutional setting in which policymaking 
takes place is something different compared to the informal setting in 
which controversies emerge [51], applying the notion of agenda-setting 
makes sense, as it organises the process of negotiating conflicting views 
on a certain policy. 
It is important to emphasise that policy agendas do not only convey 
the list of issues that are part of the discourse around a specific energy 
project (cf. [52]); they also articulate the way in which these issues are 
framed [53]. As such, policy agendas are decisive for decision-making 
on energy projects, as they shape the uptake of issues in further deci-
sion-making and execution. Controversy spillovers are a specific type of 
agenda-setting processes, where other controversies elsewhere in time 
or place become part of the policy agenda through the uptake of new 
issues derived from these controversies, or the (re)framing of the energy 
project based on other controversies. 
This understanding of controversy spillover elicits important ques-
tions about the who and the how in respect of agency. Controversy 
spillovers, similar to conventional agenda-setting processes, can both 
involve deliberate attempts of reframing issues that are on the policy 
agenda or that will be added to that agenda, as well as contingent pro-
cesses resulting in the linking of previously separated policy issues or 
information. With respect to the latter, our account of controversy 
spillover invokes the classic ‘garbage can model’ [54], which claims 
that issues on the political agenda have not been put there on a rational 
basis, but on the basis of chance. Metaphorically speaking, they are 
dropped from a ‘garbage can’ that contains all possible policy issues. 
This garbage can model has been given its most influential articulation 
in Kingdon’s so-called streams model [55,56], which explains how a 
solution to a problem within a given political situation can be either the 
outcome of a series of unintentional events or of the deliberate efforts of 
a ‘policy entrepreneur’. 
2.4. Three ideal types of controversy spillover 
We identify different kinds of controversy spillover in energy con-
troversies. Based on patterns observed in manifestations of spillovers, 
we propose the following categorisation. First, controversy spillover 
may be spatial: a controversy in one place may spill over to another 
place. We refer to this type of spillover as geographical spillover. Second, 
controversy spillover may concern technologies: a controversy on one 
technology may spill over to another technology. We label this type of 
spillover as technology spillover. Technology spillover could occur at the 
same, but also at different locations. Third, controversy spillover may 
also be temporal: it may arise from earlier controversies about other 
policy issues within a region. We label this type of spillover as historical 
spillover. We propose these three categories as ideal types, in the sense 
that they are analytical reconstructions that help to disentangle the 
complexity of empirical reality so to convey a clearer understanding of 
the observed phenomenon. These categories are not exhaustive and in 
reality controversies may involve different and intertwined controversy 
spillovers reflecting particular socio-economic, cultural, physical, and/ 
or political attributes. 
To conclude, a controversy spillover implies a changed policy agenda 
of an energy project, either through adding new issues on the agenda, 
or through reframing. Such a controversy spillover occurs when actors 
explicitly refer to a controversy around a similar technology elsewhere, 
to earlier controversies at the same location, or to controversies on 
other technology, leading to discursive change regarding the specific 
energy project in question. In the next section, we will present three 
empirical examples, each of which illustrates one of the three types of 
controversy spillover. 
3. Empirical examples of the three types of controversy spillover 
The first example concerns geographical spillover in the Dutch shale 
gas controversy. The second example is a technology spillover in the 
Swiss controversy on geothermal energy. The third example is a his-
torical spillover in a Dutch controversy on wind energy. In the pre-
sentation of the examples, we follow the conceptualisation of con-
troversy spillover as agenda-setting. After giving a short description of 
the energy project, we describe the agenda before spillover, the spil-
lover itself, and how it changed the agenda. These examples serve to 
empirically illustrate the three types of spillover. 
3.1. Geographical spillover: The Dutch shale gas debate 
3.1.1. The energy project 
In 2009, the first plans were made for exploration of shale gas in the 
Netherlands, when the British oil company Cuadrilla requested ex-
ploration permits for two areas in the Netherlands. In 2011, Cuadrilla 
received a planning permit from the municipality of Boxtel, a small 
town in the south of the Netherlands, to start shale gas exploration. 
Later, when Cuadrilla requested the municipal construction permit for 
its production facilities, the municipality of Boxtel initially treated the 
request as a business-as-usual request for an industrial activity. It soon 
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became a highly controversial project, however. Spillover from con-
troversies on shale gas in the US and the UK played an important role in 
the evolution of the Dutch shale gas debate [57]. 
3.1.2. Initial agenda 
Since the 1960s, The Netherlands experienced the benefits of large 
scale exploitation of natural gas reserves. In the first decade of the new 
millennium, interest in shale gas in the Netherlands increased, like in 
other countries all over the world. At that time, expectations were that 
shale gas was present in substantial volumes in Dutch soil [58,59]. This 
was the main reason for EBN (Energie Beheer Nederland; the Dutch 
state-participant involved in all oil and gas production in the country) 
and Cuadrilla to invest in the exploration of this resource, as a test for 
the feasibility and profitability of shale gas production in The Nether-
lands. Shale gas was seen as a promising energy source that would fit in 
easily with the existing Dutch natural gas based energy system [60]. 
3.1.3. Spillover 
The controversy started when residents of Boxtel began searching 
online for information on shale gas. They found Gasland (2010), a 
documentary on the impact of shale gas exploration and production in 
the US. Gasland informs about health problems and the death of ani-
mals which, according to the documentary, are related to the con-
tamination of the air, water wells and surface water. In the most famous 
and compelling scene of the documentary, someone shows how his 
drinking water got contaminated with gas by igniting the water as it 
streams out of his tap. The threats staged in Gasland were reason for 
Boxtel residents to express their concern about the intended exploration 
activities, especially regarding safety and pollution. 
In spring 2011, newspapers reported on earthquakes in Blackpool 
(UK) that were caused by fracking activities in a shale gas project, also 
operated by Cuadrilla. At a hearing in the Dutch Parliament, most 
questions referred to the earthquakes in Blackpool and the US. Experts, 
as well as Cuadrilla, responded to the questions by explaining that the 
situation in the Netherlands is not comparable to the UK or the US, that 
strict regulation would apply to mining activities in the proximity of 
water reservoirs, and that the geological conditions would make it 
unlikely for gas to contaminate ground water. In the Netherlands the 
distance between earth layers is over 2000 m, instead of only 100 m in 
the US. In February 2013, the director of Cuadrilla made similar claims 
in a national newspaper, stressing the different geological conditions of 
the location where the exploration would take place. In Blackpool, 
subsurface fault lines were drilled through, whereas this risk would be 
small in the Netherlands as fault lines have been mapped extensively  
[61]. 
3.1.4. Changed agenda 
The initial policy agenda on shale gas exploration was shaped by 
national policy actors, particularly EBN, who framed shale gas as a 
promising energy source for the future, well aligned with the Dutch gas- 
based system. Without any actual exploration activities, the geo-
graphical spillover changed the agenda, which was then given shape by 
a plurality of societal actors and in which shale gas was framed as a 
risky technology for which a precautionary approach was deemed ap-
propriate. Moreover, it was argued that it would take away resources 
that should be spent on a transition to renewable energy sources [19]. 
As a consequence, the policy agenda involved an increasingly wider set 
of local and national actors and was covering all kinds of new issues 
(e.g. environmental safety, seismic risks, role of shale gas in energy 
transition), while reframing shale exploitation from a promising tech-
nology to a risky technology with a debatable role in the energy tran-
sition. In August 2013, the Minister of Economic Affairs decided to put 
shale gas exploration on hold. Five years later, government decided that 
shale gas was ‘no longer an option for the Netherlands’ [62]. 
3.2. Technology spillover: The Swiss deep geothermal energy debate 
3.2.1. The energy project 
Since the mid-2000s, several Swiss local authorities and energy 
operators have launched deep geothermal energy (DGE) projects. One 
way to capture geothermal heat involves fracking to create artificial 
reservoirs at a depth of 3000 m or more, to enable the circulation of 
water injected in the bedrock. In 2015, in the town of Haute-Sorne in 
the Canton of Jura in western Switzerland, the construction of a DGE 
power plant was authorised. Local groups started demonstrating and up 
until now the controversy has not been settled [98]. The Swiss debate 
on DGE has been reframed by reference to shale gas technology, and 
therefore serves as an example of technology spillover. 
3.2.2. Initial agenda 
In its Energy Strategy 2050, the Federal government supported the 
development of DGE resources as a means to enhance the generation of 
renewable electricity [63]. There was (and still is) very little knowledge 
about the location of hot aquifers in the Swiss deep underground. 
Hence, producing geothermal electricity on a large scale in Switzerland 
requires the use of fracking to create an artificial geothermal reservoir 
independent from the presence of naturally formed hot aquifers [99]. 
3.2.3. Spillover 
A report on the risks and opportunities of fracking from the Federal 
Expert Commission on Geology [64] triggered debates in the national 
and local parliaments about whether authorising DGE in Switzerland 
would open the way to fracking for the exploitation of shale oil and gas. 
Opponents of the DGE power plant in Haute-Sorne in the Canton Jura 
argued that DGE is a technology very similar to fracking, and that it will 
cause repeated induced earthquakes and groundwater pollution, like 
fracking did in US regions that have experienced a shale-boom [65]. It 
was also suggested that DGE projects might be a cover-up to develop 
shale gas exploitation ([66], p. 7). 
The technology spillover from shale gas exploitation to DGE also 
surfaced in the parliamentary arena. The report from the Federal Expert 
Commission on Geology recommended that federal laws on the un-
derground should not ban the technique [64]. The commission argued 
that this would support technological innovation for DGE. Furthermore, 
the commission intended to leave the door open to potential exploita-
tion of oil and gas deposits, which are occasionally encountered in the 
process of drilling. At federal and cantonal levels, this sparked discus-
sions about a ban on fracking and politicians asked the federal gov-
ernment to take position. The national debate inspired parliamentary 
debates in those cantons that were in the process of revising their law 
for the underground. In Zurich, for example, delegates of the Green 
Party tabled a motion asking the cantonal government to forbid 
fracking [67]. Although the title of the motion called for “No fracking in 
the Canton of Zurich”, the text stated that this would not apply to DGE, 
but only to shale gas extraction. The motion was rejected in 2015. 
3.2.4. Changed agenda 
While in the initial agenda came DGE was framed as a renewable 
energy source and an important technology for achieving renewable 
electricity targets, this changed under influence of discursive links to 
shale gas technology. As in the previous example, a plurality of actors 
on several levels became involved in the case , who reframed DGE with 
explicit reference to risks of fracking based on experiences with shale 
gas production. As of December 2019, the project in Haute-Sorne was 
set on hold and the local parliament is considering legal possibilities to 
withdraw the authorisation. As in the same time frame several con-
ventional deep geothermal projects for district heating moved forward 
successfully, the Federal government changed its policy to prioritise 
geothermal electricity production and increased financial incentives for 
geothermal heat production [99]. 
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3.3. Historical spillover: The Dutch peat colonies 
3.3.1. The energy project 
In 2011 the formal planning procedures for two onshore wind farms 
in the north-east of the Netherlands (‘De Drentse Monden & 
Oostermoer’ (DDMO) and ‘N33′) were initiated. Both plans triggered 
fierce local opposition. Opponents claimed that, in addition to the im-
pact of sound and shadow flicker, the specific local landscape of the 
peatlands (the so-called peat colonies or ‘Veenkoloniën’) would change 
drastically. The case is an example of historical spillover, because op-
ponents explicitly drew from pre-existing sources of contention in the 
region’s past. 
3.3.2. Initial agenda 
Since the beginning of the 21th century, wind energy has become 
increasingly important in the Dutch energy transition policy. In 2000, 
the Province of Groningen designated a location next to the provincial 
main road N33 as one of the potential wind energy locations in their 
provincial plan. The municipalities Veendam and Menterwolde, where 
most of the wind turbines were planned, held the position that a wind 
farm next to the N33 and close to an urbanised area, was undesirable. 
The Municipality of Veendam had made this part of its official policy 
since a long time, already declaring a moratorium on the development 
of wind farms in their vicinity in 2002 [68]. Issues on the agenda were 
the spatial and environmental impact of wind turbines and targets for 
wind energy production. 
3.3.3. Spillover 
The north east of the Netherlands has faced several initiatives for 
large-scale wind-farms, as to achieve targets set by the national gov-
ernment [69]. In addition to DDMO and N33, in recent years multiple 
large-scale onshore wind farms have been developed in the northern 
region, and several more wind projects (aiming at a capacity of more 
than 100 MW) are in different stages of formal planning procedures  
[70].This has reignited a pre-existing sentiment amongst local com-
munities that renewable energy production is yet another way for the 
rest of the country to profit from the region’s resources. The northern 
region of the Netherlands has a long history of extraction of different 
types of energy and other resources for national and international 
purposes, which started in the 17th century, when peat was extracted 
from the peripheral Dutch provinces of Drenthe, Overijssel and Gro-
ningen. Generally, rich traders from cities in the central provinces of 
Holland invested in the exploitation of the Peat Colonies, thus securing 
the energy supply of wealthy Holland [71]. In later stages, the area 
became known for its large-scale production of cereals by a relatively 
limited number of wealthy landowners, ‘exploiting’ local labour [72]. 
In the 1950s, Groningen could be characterised as a peripheral area 
dominated by a labour-intensive agriculture and industry paying low 
wages. In 1959, a natural gas field was discovered below the province 
of Groningen, which turned out to be one of the largest gas fields in the 
world, containing 2800 billion cubic meters of gas and spreading out 
over 900 square kilometres [73]. The way in which the field was 
exploited reconfirmed the sentiment of the northern region being used 
as a colony. In 1972 a people’s congress was organized in the city of 
Groningen with the main slogan being ‘Groningen, not a colony!’ (in 
Dutch: ‘Groningen géén wingewest!’) [74]. Billions of gas revenues flowed 
directly to the state budget. In response to numerous and increasingly 
forceful earthquakes induced by gas extraction (the first one in 1986 in 
Assen [75]) and the way in which damages caused by these earthquakes 
were handled, mass public demonstrations and a fierce debate arose 
post-2012. 
The notion of colony, i.e. the idea that this region has repeatedly 
been exploited by private entrepreneurs or the government for the 
benefit of other parts of the country, has spilled over into the public 
debate around the development of wind farms. The project consortia for 
both the DDMO and the N33 wind farm involved project developers and 
consortia of local farmers and land owners. On online media and in 
discussions, the farmers in the consortia, framed as historically wealthy 
land owners, are accused of yet again unjustly treating the local com-
munities. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, overseeing the 
formal procedures for both proposed projects, is perceived as a top- 
down ruler, also (again) putting national above local interests. 
Meanwhile, all court cases against the construction of the wind farms 
have been decided in favour of the project developers. 
3.3.4. Changed agenda 
The initial agenda was already contentious. On the one hand, wind 
farms were seen as necessary to achieve renewable energy targets, but 
on the other, opponents were protesting against the environmental and 
spatial impact of wind farms. Due to explicit referencing to the region’s 
history as a colony, where resources were extracted for the national 
benefit but with local burdens, the policy agenda changed. Local actors, 
opponents to the wind farms, referred to the piling up of multiple 
controversies around energy production in the regions, thereby adding 
the issue of justice to the policy agenda. 
4. Discussion 
The three empirical examples highlight spillover as an important 
mechanism in the temporal dynamics of controversy and the related 
policy agenda. The three types of spillover can be used as analytical 
categories to trace the dynamics of energy controversies. As said, con-
troversies typically involve not just one, but several types of spillover. 
The Dutch shale gas case was not only characterised by geographical 
spillovers from shale gas debates elsewhere in the world. We also ob-
serve the spillover from controversies on other subsurface technologies, 
such as onshore carbon capture and storage in the Dutch town of 
Barendrecht [25] and later the natural gas extraction in Groningen in 
the north of the Netherlands. So, technology spillover also plays a role 
in this case. In the Swiss deep geothermal case, in addition to tech-
nology spillover, also geographical spillover played a role, as induced 
seismic risks in the US were discursively used by opponents to associate 
DGE with shale gas. 
The notion of geographical spillover acknowledges that the geo-
graphy of an energy project is not a given, i.e. its “environment” is not a 
fixed nor clearly demarcated space [76]. It highlights that the spatial 
extension of what might be taken into account during a controversy is 
not limited to the immediate surroundings directly impacted by a 
project, or even to the boundaries of the local administration that 
makes decisions about the project. Instead, the notion of geographical 
spillover points to the possibility of actors shaping the discursive space 
of a controvery by linking up with remote locations, such as the pro-
vince of Northern Brabant in the Netherlands, or even the UK and the 
US. 
The notion of technology spillover highlights a common pattern in 
controversies about emerging technologies, in which actors engaged in 
the controversy make more or less relevant analogies with ‘problems’ 
related to other technologies [77]. Such connections between different 
technologies are often ignored – or even rejected - by energy project 
developers assessing a project’s context. They make formal distinctions 
between technologies, which on the contrary are seen as similar by 
other actors. Moreover, in situations of controversy, project developers 
as well as experts tend to dissociate different technologies to avoid 
‘contamination’ by other controversies, arguing that they constitute a 
different context. We observed this in the shale gas case, where experts 
argued that the technologies used in the Netherlands considerably 
differed from those in the US. Likewise in the Swiss DGE case, the de-
velopers insisted that the techniques they are using to create artificial 
geothermal reservoirs, differ significantly from what is done in the 
shale gas industry. 
Finally, historical spillovers point to the various ways in which ac-
tors might relate to a region’s past. Here, past controversies experienced 
E. Cuppen, et al.   Energy Research & Social Science 68 (2020) 101593
5
by the actors play an important role in their perception and reaction to 
new energy projects [78]. This past is, however, not limited to recent 
events or other project-related controversies. It may include a full re-
pertoire of past socio-economic, historical, cultural and political ties, 
sometimes remote in time, that are mobilised by the actors to make 
sense of a current situation, as illustrated by the “peat colonies” case. 
What is needed is a better and more detailed understanding of the 
ways in which controversy spillovers emerge and how that affects 
policymaking regarding a particular project. Yet, all three examples 
show that controvery spillover affects and is affected by wider policy 
dynamics. For instance, in the Dutch shale gas case the local con-
troversy in Boxtel triggered a nation-wide debate which eventually led 
to a moratorium on shale gas development. In the Swiss case the con-
troversy led to parliamentary debates in those cantons that were re-
vising their law for the underground. However, the examples also show 
differences with respect to the effect that spillover had on policy-
making. In the Dutch shale gas case controversy spillover led to aban-
doning shale gas, whereas, in Switserland, the spillover from shale gas 
to geothermal energy did not lead to a ban on fracking at national level. 
Similarly in the case of the peat colonies, the addition of justice claims 
to the policy agenda did not result in court rulings against wind energy 
projects. 
Controversy spillover involves both deliberate strategic attempts by 
actors to shape policy framing as well as unintentional and emergent 
spillovers. For instance, the historical spillover in the Peat colonies case 
was strongly shaped by opponents of the proposed wind farms who 
continuously mobilised the notion of exploitation in the ‘wingewest’ 
frame. In the Swiss case references were available to actors enabling 
them to interpret the use of fracking technology as something con-
troversial. This link becomes apparent when considering that, in 2006, 
a DGE pilot project in the city of Basel triggered a relatively significant 
earthquake, but there was no spillover from the the shale fracking de-
bate at that time. The reason may be that fracking for shale gas had not 
yet received very wide media attention. This means that it is not only 
important to understand how controversy spillovers emerge, but also 
why they emerge in some, but not in other situations. 
We started this paper by conceptualizing controversy as a complex 
and dynamic process of participatory assessment of a technology or 
(proposed) project. The three types of spillover are analytical categories 
that can be used to structure such complex and dynamic processes. 
Identifying spillovers in the early stages of decision-making has several 
practical implications. Firstly, as a dynamic form of assessment, con-
troversy spillover puts emphasis on the necessity of having flexible and 
adaptive assessment approaches for decision-making, so as to accom-
modate new or changed issues, values or concerns. This may be at odds 
with formal assessment in energy planning, where there is typically a 
strict definition of what issues and values need to be assessed and how. 
Therefore, it may call for expanding the existing assessment repertoire. 
Secondly, the three types of spillover can help policymakers and 
planners to anticipate controversy spillover. For instance, technology 
spillover may be lurking for all subsurface energy and/or climate mi-
tigation technologies, such as oil and gas production, geothermal en-
ergy and heat networks, carbon capture and storage, gas storage in 
empty gas fields and so on. In this respect, in the Netherlands it can be 
observed that particularly local authorities have learned from con-
troversies about subsurface technologies. As a kind of institutionalized 
spillover, we see that municipalities, provinces and water boards, in-
creasingly anticipate controversy by including issues such as earth 
movements, soil inclination, pollution of drinking water et cetera, in 
local procedures for spatial planning and construction permits, re-
gardless which subsurface activity a permit involves. Elsewhere, we 
have referred to this phenomenon as ‘backflow’ [13]. Anticipating 
controversies thus requires policy-makers to have substantive aware-
ness and alertness to controversies elsewhere in time and place. To 
anticipate, policymakers and planners could involve community en-
gagement officers, who are tasked with communication and 
participation of local communities [79]. In this process they may be the 
ones who have (already) developed sensitivity for the local and and 
broader context. Thirdly, the empirical examples have shown that the 
way policymakers respond to controversy is key in how a spillover 
unfolds. Both the Dutch shale gas case and the Swiss DGE case for in-
stance show that experts try to avoid ‘contamination’ by framing and 
reframing their technology. Saying that a technology is NOT like the 
one it is associated with by opponents (as in the shale gas case), is 
typically not a strong act of framing, as it implies stepping into the 
opponent’s frame. Thereby, it basically strengthens the frame used by 
opponents [80]. Although reframing is typically a more effective 
strategy than stepping into the other person’s frame [80], this was not 
successful in the DGE case: opponents felt proponents were trying to 
hide the risky nature of the technology. 
5. Conclusion and research agenda on controversy spillovers in 
energy controversies 
We argue that to understand controversy, as a specific form of 
public engagement in energy policy and planning, a shift is needed from 
studying single, discrete cases or events of controversy, to studying 
dynamics of interrelated controversies occurring in different places and 
times. For this, we propose and conceptualise the notion of controversy 
spillover as a form of agenda-setting, i.e. the deliberate or unintentional 
ways in which issues get reframed, or new issues get on the policy 
agenda. Controversy spillover, as compared to context, firstly focuses 
attention on the relation between controversies as object of interest 
rather than to a controversy itself. Secondly, it emphasises the temporal 
dynamics of controversies as social processes, the context of which is 
not static. Instead, what actors define as important context changes 
over time, also in reaction to what project developers and authorities 
do. 
We identify three types of controversy spillover: geographical, 
technology and historical spillover, which serve as analytical categories 
for further empirical analysis. We propose four lines of research that 
support a more detailed understanding of the emergence and impact of 
controversy spillovers. These lines of research relate to: 1) the empirical 
and temporal analysis of the emergence and impact of spillover; 2) the 
travelling of issues and information, and the role of conventional and the 
new social media; 3) meta-analysis of the dynamics of controversies and 
4) questions about political and democratic repercussions that come 
with controversy spillovers. We will subsequently discuss these research 
lines below. 
5.1. Analysis of the emergence and impact of spillover 
A first line of research concerns the empirical analysis of the con-
ditions under which spillover may occur, what type of spillover emerges 
and its impact on policymaking. What characteristics of a controversy 
(technology, actor constellation, political climate, etc.) make it sus-
ceptible to spillovers in the first place? How do project initiators re-
spond to controversy spillovers, what strategies (e.g. communication, 
public/community engagement, etc.) do they use and how effective are 
these? What types of impact of spillover can be identified (e.g. effec-
tiveness, legitimacy, capacity building, policy learning, etc.) and under 
what conditions do these impacts occur? 
In general, it can be said that controversy spillovers arise in different 
arenas, where different actors are active in (re)framing the policy issue, 
and these arenas and actors may all interact in some way or another. 
Some controversy spillovers are the result of deliberate framing stra-
tegies, others happen to be more accidental. Furthermore, our examples 
also show divergent responses to controversy spillovers. Faced with a 
‘contamination’ by failed or heavily protested projects elsewhere, in-
itiators deploy strategies of ‘purification’, i.e. attempts to dissociate 
what they do from the controversial technologies or projects they were 
associated with [81]. In the Dutch shale gas case, researchers have tried 
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to stress the differences in geological as well as legal conditions be-
tween the Dutch situation and the situation in the UK and US. In 
Switzerland, promoters of DGE insist that the techniques they are using 
to create artificial geothermal reservoirs are different from what is done 
in the shale gas industry. They attempt to reframe their hydraulic 
fracturing technique as “hydraulic stimulation” or “hydraulic shearing”, 
arguing that they operate in naturally faulted geological formations and 
only widen existing fractures. These strategies might backfire: oppo-
nents to the Haute-Sorne DGE project argued that the use of “hydraulic 
stimulation” by projects managers was an attempt to evade discussions 
on the consequences of fracking and thus a further indication of the 
risky nature of the project. 
5.2. Travelling of issues and information and the role of conventional and 
new forms of media 
A second line of research involves the travelling of issues and in-
formation as part of controversy spillover dynamics. Information and 
issues can travel through various policy, advocacy or personal net-
works. In all three examples, the spillover seems to be largely shaped by 
the informational resources acquired by actors through different media. 
Residents of Boxtel were actively looking for information on shale gas 
on the internet and found the documentary Gasland, which was an 
important trigger for the protest. National newspapers reporting on 
local protests on shale gas induced a shift in the debate on shale gas, 
moving from a local safety risk to a normative discussion about the role 
of shale gas in the energy transition. Meanwhile, the protests against 
the proposed wind farms in Groningen were picked up by national 
media rather late, and not until opponents began to apply unusually 
aggressive methods of protest. Here the spillover strongly relied on 
regional media coverage, which also grew when the conflict intensified. 
Interestingly, the media play a rather paradoxical role in the analysis of 
controversy spillovers or controversies more general [82]. On the one 
hand, media coverage can be seen as an approximation of the public 
debate or a reflection of discourses [82–84]. On the other hand, in to-
day’s media landscape the role of the information providers is highly 
multifarious, with a huge variation in their coverage of audiences, 
objectives, strategies and business-models. In general, we observe that 
media analysis has focussed on the representation of technologies, so 
far [85,86]. However, the media also play a role as a collection of in-
teracting, competing and cooperating journalists and businesses. It is 
about people with interests and preferences, who create, make or dis-
tribute pieces of information, and who, with their writing or sharing, 
participate in the public debate [87]. Moreover, the particular role of 
social media has been given only limited attention [88]. In our analysis 
of the cases discussed in this paper, we observe that journalists and the 
(social) media are important players who shape the course of the pro-
cess [89]. Yet, whereas they carry controversies, enable spillover phe-
nomena, and bring in new (groups of) actors [90], they are hardly ever 
considered as actors themselves in studies on public engagement. 
5.3. Meta-analysis of dynamics of public engagement 
A third line of research concerns the meta-analysis of the dynamics 
of controversies, especially in relation to dynamics of other forms of 
public engagement (e.g. invited participation or community energy 
initiatives). What are typical patterns in the way controversy spillovers 
emerge and how energy projects are framed and reframed, and what 
are the outcomes of such processes? How does one type of engagement 
(e.g. protest) spill over to other types of engagement (e.g. participation 
in energy production as prosumer)? This also entails investigating the 
dynamics of interaction between different types of actors on a meta 
level. Here, we should not only look at communities and stakeholders 
who are partaking in public engagement and participartion, but also 
include actors who organise and/or shape public engagement, like 
governmental actors at different levels (state, province, municipalities), 
project initiators, consulting firms and the media. For instance, an en-
ergy project sometimes becomes contested after project initiators or-
ganise some form of participation (e.g. a public meeting). Also, invited 
participation may trigger citizens to become engaged in energy projects 
themselves [91]. This allows for studying public engagement and the 
relation with spillover effects in a more holistic and/or systemic way  
[92]. 
This addresses the question as to how, or to what extent, con-
troversy spillovers can be anticipated or ‘turned into’ other forms of 
public engagement. Knowing whether there are typical patterns and 
understanding what these patterns entail, may help to anticipate con-
troversy spillovers. Patterns could be investigated with a meta-synthesis 
of existing literature, especially publications that include detailed de-
scriptions of controversies and their context. Also, approaches such as 
qualitative comparative analysis and computational social science 
methods, such as modelling, GIS analysis and simulation, may be useful 
to explore typical patterns of controversy spillover. For this, large da-
tasets need to be constructed that include data on indicators reflecting 
the three dimensions relevant to controversy spillover (temporal, spa-
tial and technology). 
5.4. Political and democratic repercussions of controversy spillovers 
Finally, controversy spillovers give rise to a set of questions per-
taining to issues of procedural justice and legitimacy that need to be 
addressed. Controversy spillovers can be seen as a manifestation of the 
democratic claim of societal actors for inclusivity and empowerment. 
With respect to this demand, a controversy could, for instance, give rise 
to renegotiating the way issues are framed on an initial policy agenda, 
making decision-makers more responsive to the needs and concerns of 
those actors who are affected by their decisions. As such, opening up to 
new issues and framings can be seen as a major democratic requisite (cf.  
[13,93]), directing our focus more towards the process instead of only 
the outcomes of policymaking. Existing experimental research suggests 
that the perceived fairness of decision processes matters more than the 
outcome [94]. Further research is needed in order to assess in what 
respect process legitimacy is affected by a changing agenda after the 
integration of concerns and demands resulting from a controversy 
spillover. The notion of spillover allows research of democratic pol-
icymaking as a dynamic and dialectical process in which proposed 
policies and projects invoke societal reactions, either or not giving rise 
to enhanced inclusivity or empowerment. This acknowledgment of 
democratic dynamics is largely absent in the literature, as the focus 
typically appears to be on the assessment of singular decision-making 
processes, such as specific agenda-setting activities or participatory 
processes. Our account of controversy spillovers underlines that re-
search should not look at such processes as one-off events, but that the 
relation between policymakers and publics needs to be studied as an 
ongoing reiterative process. 
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